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I. AN INTRODUCTION
The guarantees of freedom of expression set forth in the First
Amendment* are as basic to our concept of government as the form of the
government itself. For unless ideas can be intelligently and freely exchanged, there can be no justification for adherence to a system which
entrusts the citizen with the power of the ballot. Ignorance does not
become wisdom merely by being multiplied.
Thus, it is of paramount importance to the society, as well as to the
individual, that the nation be kept as free as is possible from inhibitionssmall or large, obvious or covert, standard or unique-which may serve
to delimit the citizen's ability to base his ballot upon a full, free and
intelligent discussion.

Holmes described the system as a marketplace of ideas. The simile
has particular significance for this article. The market system presumes
a seller, but it also presumes a buyer as well as access to and from the
f Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor in Research
and Writing for Freshmen.
* In an attempt to insure a comprehensive grasp of the area of this comment, the writer
resorted to a number of treatises dealing with the general area of the first amendment.
Among the most helpful were: CHAPEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UN TE STATES (1948) ; CHAlEE,
FRE SPEECH IN THE CONSTITUTION (1941) ; MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1st ed. 1960) ;
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (Ist ed. 1948);
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963). An
interesting analysis was added by the publication, late in the preparation of the paper, of an
article by Justice Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965).
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market. Of the selling aspect of our marketplace of ideas, the Supreme
Court has considered and determined much. As a result, there is today a
defined, protectible interest against government action which inhibits
expression-be it against the person of the expressor, the time or place of
the expression, or the content of the expression.
Much less, however, has been decided about the protectible interests
of the buyer, or for that matter, about the access to information which
provides the basis of the expression. In both of these, the interest is in
acquiring the basis for decision making. While there have been decisions
discussing the nature or extent of this interest, they have been relatively
few in number and limited in their treatment.
In the past two terms of the Supreme Court, however, the nature of
that interest was thrice presented to the Court.' It is the purpose of this
article to examine each of those three cases: first, in the perspective of
their respective areas; and second in relation to First Amendment theory.
After that analysis, the interest itself will be analyzed: first, as it was
recognized prior to these three decisions; second, as it was affected by
these three decisions; and finally, as it currently appears to exist as a
feature of the First Amendment landscape.
II.

THE TALE OF THREE CASES

A. The Right of InternationalTravel
1. GENERAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Of the three decisions which provide the springboard for this article, two of them, Apthecker v. Secretary of State,2 and Zemel v. Rusk,'
deal with a relatively modern area of constitutional concern-restriction
upon international travel. The area is a modern one because the restrictions themselves are rather contemporary developments in American
society.
Indeed, until the early twentieth century, the ingress and egress of
American citizens was relatively unrestricted by any form of government
action. The lack of restriction had its historical roots in early Anglo-Saxon
tradition. The Magna Carta ostensibly deprived the King of the right to
restrict the exit of his citizens from English soil,4 and it was thereafter
1. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1
(1965) ; Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
2. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
3. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).

4. Two specific clauses of the Magna Carta restricted the power of the king to restrict
the right of Englishmen to enter or leave England. One, clause 41, extended a rather comprehensive system of such rights specifically to merchants. The other, clause 42, was more
general in its apparent application:
c. 42. It shall be lawful in the future for anyone (excepting always those imprisoned
or outlawed in accordance with the law of the kingdom, and natives of any country
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generally believed that the English citizen had a common law right to
enter or leave his country at will.'
There is little reason to believe that any other rule obtained in
early American history. Our early post-constitutional history is relatively
free of any evidence of restraint on internal or international travel by
American citizens. Indeed, the Supreme Court had early declared that the
right of an American citizen to travel among the several states was a
constitutional right which was protectible against state infringement.6
Moreover, while it became customary for passports to be issued to an
American citizen who desired to travel outside of the United States, the
statutes authorizing their issuance were clearly and correctly interpreted
to limit the effect of the passport to one of a request for courteous treatment in the contemplated nation of travel 7 rather than as a legal prerequisite to international travel. Subsequent actions, both legislative and
administrative, have altered this position in the United States,8 but it is
at war with us, and merchants who shall be treated as is above provided) to leave
our kingdom and to return, safe and secure by land and water, except for a short
period of time of war, on grounds of public policy-reserving always the allegiance
due us. As translated in McKECHNIF, MArNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON TE GREAT
CnARTER OF KInG JOHN (2d ed. 1914) as quoted in Note, Passports and Freedom of
Travel, 14 GEo. L.J. 63, 66 n.12 (1962).
5. In the subsequent republication of the Magna Carta liberties by Henry III, after the
death of King John, clause 41, supra note 4, was deleted. Later practices by the Kings, espedally the imposition of the writ of ne exeat regunum, serve to demonstrate that the right of
travel could be restricted by an exercise of royal power. Yet these restrictions were few, and
over the years their impositions were so rarely employed that it came to be believed that the
Englishman was clothed with a common law right to travel freely to and from his country,
"for whatever cause he pleaseth, without obtaining the King's leave.. ." 1 B1. Comm. 265. For
a more thorough historical analysis of the early English developments, see Note, Passports
and Freedom of Travel, 14 GEo. L.J. 63 (1952).
6. The right of a citizen to travel between the states was first declared by the Court in
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1897).
We are all citizens of the United States and as members of the same community
must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States. Quoting the dissent of Chief Justice Taney
in The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
The nature of that right was subsequently defined as a "liberty" protected by the due
process of law in William v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 279 (1900), but the Court subsequently
chose to be less definitive when it expanded the characterization in Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 163 (1941):
Freedom of movement and of residence must be a fundamental right in a democratic State. Whether within the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or within the term liberty in the due process clause, it is a basic
constitutional right ....
7. Every statute authorizing the imposition of restraints on the travel of citizens outside of the United States has been related to, and justified upon, the existence of military
conflict. For an early judicial analysis of the passport in a period prior to its becoming a
legal prerequisite to international travel, see Urtetiqul v. D'Arbel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692
(1835). The statutes, and their respective wars are: War of 1812, Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31,
§ 10, 3 Stat. 199; World War 1, Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, § 2, 40 Stat. 559, made
effective by a Presidential proclamation of emergency, 40 Stat. 1829 (1918), and terminated
at the conclusion of hostilities by Joint Resolution on Mar. 31, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359;
World War II, Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252.
8. In the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the passport was made, in § 215
of that Act, a condition of lawful exit and entry during a state of "national emergency."
66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185. The President was vested with the power to proclaim the
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significant to note this provision in the Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations:
Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own.'
2.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESTRICTIONS

It was not until 1856, that the Congress reacted to the increasing
significance of international travel. This reaction came in the form of a
delegation of authority to the Secretary of State over the issuance of
passports. That delegation was delimited only by the qualification that it
be exercised pursuant to "such rules as the President shall designate and
prescribe for and on behalf of the United States. ... "10
It is history that the passports authorized therein were, at the time,
little more than a request for courtesy addressed to those nations to which
the applicant proposed to travel." This remained the case, with few
exceptional instances, over the course of several re-delegations of that
power and discretion.' Indeed, until 1952, the Secretary's denial of a
passport had no legal effect on the right of entry or exit of American
citizens except for brief impositions of greater legal import during the
course of both World Wars.
In 1952, the pressures of the Cold War led to the enactment of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which provided in section 215 that
upon a proclamation of a state of "national emergency" by the President
it would thereafter be unlawful for anyone to enter or leave the United
States without a valid passport.'8
Early in the following year, President Truman proclaimed such a
state of "national emergency."' 4 That proclamation has never been restate of national emergency. President Truman exercised that power the next year. Exec.
Proc. No. 3004 of Jan. 17, 1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 489. That proclamation remains in effect
today, and, as a result, so does the legal requirement of a passport.
9. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 13, para. 2, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL.

753 (1948).
10. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, § 23, 11 Stat. 52, 60-61, now still in effect by virtue of its
repeated reenactment in 22 U.S.C. 211(a) and by virtue of the Presidential implementation
of Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 681, 687 (1958).
11. Indeed, the discussion of the Court in Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692
(1835), clearly established the permissive nature of the early passport. A similar analysis
has been presented by those scholars who have dealt with this matter. E.g., CmAFEE, THREE
HUMAN
TRAVEL
12.
13.

RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 (1958); BAR Ass'N OF N.Y.C., FREEDOM TO
(1958); Boidin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 CoLUM. L. REV. 47 (1956).
Note 7 supra.
Act of June 27, 1952, § 215, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185:

(a) When the United States is at war or during the existence of any state of
national emergency proclaimed by the President [and when] the President shall
find that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions
be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United
States and shall make public proclamation thereof . . . (b) After such proclamation
. . . has been made . . . it shall be unlawful for any citizen to depart from or enter,

or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport.
14. Exec. Proc. No. 3004 of Jan. 17, 1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 489.
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scinded, and as a result the power vested in the Secretary of State to issue
or restrict the issuance of passports is today the power to permit or
restrict international travel.
3.

JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT

It is within this framework of legislative and executive activity that
the Court has had to work its way. The constitutional ramifications of
restraints on the right of an American citizen to travel outside of the
United States are many in number and fraught with complexities. In view
of the rather brief span of time during which these issues have become a
matter for judicial involvement,"0 the Court has more than adequately
lent definition to those ramifications. Indeed, the whole width of the
Court's opportunities for decision in this area can be measured by three
major cases over a period of seven years? 6
The first case to place the major constitutional issues before the
Court was Kent v. Dulles," in 1958. For a number of years prior to the
Kent case, the State Department had employed a practice of refusing
passports to various citizens on the basis of the political beliefs or
associations of the particular applicant. 8 Mr. Kent was such an applicant.
The Secretary of State had determined that Kent was a Communist, and
that he had shown "a consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line." 9 Accordingly, his application for a passport was
denied pursuant to section 51.135 of the regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of State. 0 Mr. Kent instituted suit to invalidate the denial, in
15. While a few previous cases dealt in one way or another with the privileges of
passport and of travel, e.g., Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692 (1835); Perkins v.
Elg, 307 U.S. 35 (1939); the issues there presented did not present for judicial scrutiny the
nature of the right to travel, nor did they raise the questions relating to the passport as a
legal prerequisite to international travel.
These more modern aspects were presented on occasion to the lower federal courts, and
not without some significant effect. After a series of decisions, it became clear that the denial

or issuance of passports was subject to the requirements of procedural due process. E.g.,
Boidin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Nathan v. Duiles, 129 F. Supp. 951
(D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, 225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955); and Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F.
Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952). It was shortly after the Bauer decision that the State Department
responded by the creation of the Board of Passport Appeals. Moreover, the protection of
substantive due process was extended to the restriction of travel in Schactman v. Dulles,
225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955) in an opinion which presaged much of the later action taken
by the Supreme Court.
16. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
17. Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958). was before the Court contemporaneously
with Kent, but the issues were so similar that the Kent decision resolved the questions in
both and as a result, Kent stands as the case of significance.
18. For an examination of those practices, see Comment, Passport Refusals for Political
Reasons, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952). See also the discussion in C-azz, Freedom of Movement,
THEREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 162-213 (1956).
19. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 118 (1958).
20. State Dep't Reg. 108.162, 17 Fed. Reg. 8013, issued Sept. 4, 1952:
In order to promote the national interest by assuring that persons who support the

world Communist movement, of which the Communist Party is an integral unit,
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response to which the Secretary asserted that he had been vested with
the authority for such denials by the repeated re-delegations of control
over the issuance of passports to the executive branch.
The Secretary did not claim that he had been specifically directed
or permitted to deny passports on the basis of the political beliefs of the
applicant. He argued that the consistent re-delegations of general discretion implied this specific discretion because he had been exercising the
discretion in that manner over a period spanning several legislative
renewals of the power grants.2 Moreover, he bolstered his contentions
with allegations that Congressional activity indicated Congress' knowledge and tacit approval of this practice.
The Court, in a five to four decision, rejected the claim of the Secretary, and held that the general legislative grants of discretion did "not
delegate to the Secretary the kind of authority exercised here."2 2 By so
declaring, the Court seemingly sidestepped the constitutional issues involved; however, the majority opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Douglas,
devoted a considerable degree of attention to those issues.
Perhaps most significantly, the Court chose to characterize the constitutional status of the right of international travel by American citizens:
The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment.... Freedom of movement is basic to our scheme of
values.23
The protection of the Fifth Amendment had been previously ascribed to
travel by the lower federal courts, 24 but the Kent declaration lent significant effect to that extension of the due process umbrella.
may not, through the use of United States passports, further the purposes of that
movement, no passport . . . shall be issued . . . [to those whose travel will be
concluded to be in furtherance of those purposes because of their membership,
association, beliefs or past activities].
This language is no longer in effect. After the Kent decision, the Secretary altered the language so as to make it coextensive with the registration requirements of the Subversive
Control Act of 1950, infra note 29. State Dep't Reg. 108.475, 27 Fed. Reg. 344, issued Jan.
12, 1962.
21. As previously discussed in note 7 supra, the legislation authorizing the Secretary
of State to issue passports arose as early as 1815, with the first really significant legislation
in 1856. That delegation of authority was continually, if sporadically, re-delegated up to
this very date, and that necessarily includes the time of the Kent determination. And, as
the reader shall see, Kent created no barrier for its further employment. However, all of
these delegations were of a general nature, and, in the Court's view, the discretion exercised
in Kent's circumstance had never been contemplated by that grant. "The key to that problem [speaking of the continuing re-delegation] is the manner in which the Secretary's
discretion was exercised, not the bare fact that he had discretion." 357 U.S. at 125.
22. Id. at 129.
23. Id.at 125.
24. Procedural due process was initially extended in Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp.
445 (D.D.C. 1952); substantive due process, in Schactman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1955).
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Perhaps as significant as that extension, however, was the absence
of any clear First Amendment protection in the opinion of the Court. In
its introductory language the Court had made it rather clear that it
recognized the First Amendment implications of Kent's petition. Kent
was being discriminated against because of his beliefs and his associations. Moreover, the Court was more than merely implicit in its recognition of the societal implications of precluding American citizens from
travel abroad. Justice Douglas chose to substantiate the Court's characterization of travel as a protected liberty with a quotation from Professor Chafee:
[T]ravel abroad enables American citizens to understand that
people like themselves live in Europe and helps them to be wellinformed on public issues. An American who has crossed the
ocean is not obliged to form his opinions about our foreign
policy merely from what he is told by officials of our government
or by a few correspondents of American newspapers. Moreover,
his views on domestic questions are enriched by seeing how
foreigners are trying to solve similar problems. In many different ways direct contact with other countries contributed to
sounder decisions at home.25
The presence of Professor Chafee's language in the opinion is
certainly cause for comment. Having determined that Congress had not
delegated the kind of authority exercised by the Secretary,26 it was quite
unnecessary for Mr. Justice Douglas to have gone to this extent to justify
the dictum that travel was a liberty within the contemplation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, Chafee's analysis of
the ramifications and importance of international travel speaks far more
strongly to interests of a First Amendment nature, than to those of the
Fifth. Yet nowhere in the remainder of the Court's opinion is there any
indication that the Court considered the proposition that there are significant interests of an expressional nature inherent in international travel.
The quotation directly raised considerations of clearly First Amendment
import, but the Court's own declarations are conspicuously devoid of any
direct reference to those implications. Thus, in this sense, at the very
least, the decision in Kent v. Dulles left the nation waiting for a really
meaningful examination of the great constitutional issues involved in the
area of international travel.
25. 357 U.S. at 126, citing CHAFEE, TmHRE HTrxN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787, 187 (1956).
26. The status of this added discussion was bitingly characterized as obiter dictum by
the dissenters (Justices Clark, Burton, Harlan, and Whittaker):
The majority's resolution of the authority question prevents it from reaching the
constitutional issues raised by the petitioner. . . . In view of that, it would be
inappropriate for me, as a dissenter, to consider these questions at this time.
357 U.S. at 143.
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4. Apthecker:

AN IGNORED PLEA

In 1964, the Supreme Court met head on the issues it had avoided in
Kent v. Dulles. That decision, in the case of Apthecker v. Secretary of
State,2 7 is the first of the three cases with which this paper is primarily
concerned.
In 1961, the government finally succeeded in bringing the American
Communist Party within the registration requirements 28 of the Subversives Activities Control Act of 1950.29 Section 6(b) of that Act made it
unlawful for any member of a "registered" organization, to make application for, or use, or attempt to use a passport. Thus, in 1961, when the
registration order became final, the State Department sent notices to
known members of the American Communist Party notifying them, inter
alia, that their passports had been revoked pursuant to the provisions of
the Act.
Herbert Apthecker was, at the time, the chairman of the American
Communist Party, as well as the editor of its theoretical organ, Political
Affairs. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Apthecker sought,
and was denied, declaratory and injunctive relief from the action of
revocation. 0 On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that
section 6 was, on its face and as applied, "an unconstitutional deprivation
of the liberty guaranteed in the Bill of Rights."'
As may be indicated by that choice of language, Mr. Apthecker's
challenge to the constitutionality of section 6 was sweepingly broad. He
chose to level an attack which was not confined to the protection of due
process established in Kent v. Dulles, and which was heavily laden with
First Amendment overtones. The attack under the First Amendment was
two pronged. The first prong struck at the basis for the Secretary's
denial. It characterized the denial as a discrimination based upon, and
thus destructive of, the freedom of beliefs and associations of the applicant. It was Apthecker's position that this discrimination amounted to a
prior restraint upon the freedom of belief and expression in that it forced
a citizen to abandon those freedoms as a prerequisite to obtaining a
passport.
The Court coupled this argument with the due process protection,
and declared that the provisions of section 6 were invalid on their face.
27. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
28. The order required to force registration by the Party was handed down by the
Subversive Activities Control Board on October 20, 1961, 26 Fed. Reg. 9923, and had already
been upheld as constitutional by the time of the Apthecker case in Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
29. Section 6, 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 785.
30. Flynn v. Rusk, 219 F. Supp. 709 (1963). Flynn was a co-complainant with
Apthecker, both in this lower court proceeding and in the appeal taken to the Supreme Court.
31. Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964).
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The language which the Court employed in announcing that decision is
curious and peculiar in that it is a clear instance of intermingling traditionally First Amendment terminology with a holding tht Court itself
characterized as falling under the Fifth Amendment due process clause:
In our view the foregoing considerations compel the conclusion
that § 6 of the Control Act is unconstitutional on its face. The
section, judged by its plain import and by the substantive evil
which Congress sought to control, sweeps too widely and indiscriminately across the liberty guaranteedin the Fifth Amendment. The prohibition against travel is supported by only a
tenuous relationship between the bare fact of organizational
membership and the activity Congress sought to proscribe. The
broad and enveloping prohibition excludes plainly relevant considerations such as the individual's knowledge, activity, commitments, and purposes in and places for travel. The section therefore is patently not a regulation "narrowly drawn to prevent the
supposed evil," cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S., at 307,
yet here, as elsewhere, precision must be the touchstone of
legislation so affecting basic freedoms, NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S., at 438. 8
But appellant's First Amendment contentions went beyond an attack
directed at the basis of denial of his passport. His attack was also directed
at the restriction on his travel. In his original complaint the appellant had
alleged that his purposes in going abroad included the acquisition of
knowledge and observations which would be reflected in his teaching and
writing upon his return to the United States.85 In his brief to the Court he
pressed this purpose as an independent First Amendment argument:
[T]he section also deprives appellants of the opportunity to
study conditions abroad and to form opinions on the basis of
what they see and hear. The situation is the same as if appellants were prohibited from going to lectures or reading books.
Appellants are being denied the First Amendment "right to
hear" in contravention of the Amendment's function of facilitating self-government by insuring to the people unfettered
access to information and ideas....
The vice of section 6 is compounded by the fact that its
prohibition of foreign travel constitutes, as in the present case,
a prior restrainton the exercise of FirstAmendment rights.34
The response of the government to this argument was twofold. First
32. Id. at 514.
33. The same basic argument had been presented by Mr. Kent. Indeed, it was probably
with this argument in mind that Justice Douglas chose to incorporate the views of Professor
Chafee in his opinion in Kent, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. The entire record on appeal including the briefs of both parties are recorded on
microfilm on file in the Baron de Hirsch Meyer Law Library at the University of Miami
School of Law. Hereinafter, the material therefrom will be cited as Brief of (name of party)
(page number of the record). Brief of Apthecker 14.
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the government argued that "The decided cases hold unanimously that
liberty to travel abroad is protected by the substantive due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment, not the First Amendment.""5 Second, and more
responsive to the appellant's argument, the government argued against
the recognition of any protectible First Amendment right in acquiring
access to information. Its contention was simply that to recognize such an
interest in this case would be to open a Pandora's box that it would be
difficult, if not impossible to close.36
The Court chose, almost completely, to ignore this First Amendment
plea raised by Apthecker. The only language in the entire opinion which
appears to speak to the First Amendment ramifications of travel was
presented as a part of the Court's explanation of its refusal to determine
the validity of section 6 "as applied." "[F] reedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech and association." 7
The absence of any verbalized consideration is especially noteworthy
once one remembers that the same basic contention had been before the
Court in the Kent case. Indeed, it was to this aspect of international
travel that Justice Douglas directed both his attention and Professor
Chafee's statement in the Kent case.3 In Apthecker, Justice Douglas
concurred in a separate opinion, approving the result and reasoning of
the majority, but adding a few comments of his own about the paramount
importance of freedom of movement to a free society. In fine, his analysis
was that short of the circumstance of active war, or some independent
power to detain as a criminal sanction, the right of an American citizen
to travel within or outside his country should be unrestricted." Absent,
however, from the expressions of Justice Douglas, was anything amounting to or calling for the recognition of a protectible First Amendment
interest arising out of international travel. It remained for another case
and another day for the Court to respond directly to the First Amendment
35. Brief of Secretary of State 55-56.
36. In the words of the Brief:
Moreover, under appellant's argument, it would be difficult, indeed, to conceive of
any activities that could not be said to provide access to information or to a particular forum for expression of beliefs. For example, deprival of a security clearance,
it could be argued, would conflict with the First Amendment because knowledge of
classified materials would permit a citizen to express more ably his views about the
issues of the day; refusal to permit an individual personal contact with the President
or a judge or to appear before Congress, would, it could be contended, directly
restrict a citizens free expression of ideas. In short, section 6 imposes only indirect,
peripheral restrictions on appellant's First Amendment rights. Id. at 56.
37. Apthecker v. Secretary of State, supra note 31, at 517.
38. Supra note 25 and accompanying text.
39. Certainly he came close enoughl Consider this excerpt from p. 520 of the dissent:
Those with the right of free movement use it at times for mischievous purposes.
But that is true of many liberties we enjoy. We nevertheless place our faith in them,
and against restraint, knowing that the risk of abusing liberty so as to give rise to
punishable conduct is part of the price we pay for this free society.
Freedom of movement is kin to the right of assembly and to the right of association. These rights may not be abridged, . . . only illegal conduct being within the
purview of crime in the constitutional sense. (Citations omitted.)
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ramifications of restraints upon the capacity of the citizen to acquire
information through his travels.
5. Zemel:

OUTRIGHT REJECTION

By 1965, Kent had already made it clear that the executive branch
itself had no independent power over the control of exit from and entry
into the United States. Apthecker had added to the definition of the
area by spelling out the Court's distaste for the exercise of the delegated
authority possessed by the executive in a manner which discriminated
against one on the basis of his beliefs or associations. These decisions
left two questions open: first, could Congress more narrowly draw a
statute under which the passport could be precluded to one on the basis
of his politics?4 ° This question remains open. The second was whether
there might be a protectible First Amendment interest in free travel
outside the United States which could act as a limitation upon the power
of the Congress to enact even non-discriminatory legislation which would
restrict the right of travel. The second question is the basic question to
which this article responds. The Court had its first opportunity to do
so in Zemel v. Rusk,4 the second case of our primary concern.
Mr. Zemel, like Messrs. Kent and Apthecker, ran into problems
when he attempted to travel. Unlike those gentlemen, the record did
not indicate any Communist affiliation on Zemel's part. Indeed, the
matter of his political affiliations had nothing to do with his difficulties.
Mr. Zemel ran into problems because of his proposed destination-Cuba.
When the Congress authorized the President to establish continuing
rules and regulations guiding the Secretary of State in his exercise of
discretion over passport issuances,' the President implemented that
delegation with an Executive Order which declared, inter alia,
The Secretary of State is authorized in his discretion to refuse
to issue a passport, to restrict a passport for use only in certain
countries, to restrict it against use in certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, and to withdraw a
passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in
certain countries.43
40. The Court refused to determine the possibility of such a statute sustaining a "valid
as applied" test, choosing instead, because of heavy First Amendment overtones, they declined to require Apthecker to "assume the burden of demonstrating that Congress could
not have written a statute constitutionally prohibiting [his] travel." 378 U.S. at 517. Previously, this refusal to test the statute "as applied" had been a procedure reserved to First
Amendment cases. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
41. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
42. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, § 23, 11 Stat. 52, 60-61 presently in effect as 22 U.S.C. 211(a)
(1965).
43. Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 681, 687 (1938).
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Those enumerated alternatives are all directed at a type of travel prohibitions termed "area restrictions." This particular grant of discretion
remains in effect today,4 4 and provided the basis for restriction placed
upon travel to Cuba, ordered by the Secretary of State in 1961.11
The order of the Secretary, however, had significantly more effect
in 1961 than it would have had in 1856, when Congress first authorized
the delegation of authority. In 1856, passports were mere conveniences,
but by 1961 the provisions of Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 had been activated by the proclamation of a state
of national emergency.46 This proclamation had made a passport a legal
prerequisite to lawful international travel. Combined with the Secretary's
declaration of the area restriction, the legislation and the proclamation
set the stage for the case of Zemel v. Rusk.47
In late 1962, Mr. Zemel, an American citizen and holder of an
otherwise valid passport, applied to the State Department for the validation of his passport for travel to Cuba. His application was denied under
the terms of the existing regulations, which limited such validations solely
to those cases specifically determined by the Secretary of State to be in
the "best interests of the United States, such as newsmen or businessmen with previously established business interests. '48 Zemel was not
a newspaperman, nor did he have business interests in Cuba; his interests
were of a different nature.
In his original correspondence, as in his complaint and appeal,
Zemel had declared that his reason for wanting to go to Cuba was "to
satisfy my curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba, and to make me
a better informed citizen. ' 49 According to the Secretary of State, this
did not meet the previously prescribed standards for such travel. But
by this approach Zemel once again placed before the Court the question
-what is the extent of a protectible First Amendment interest in the
freedom of acquisition of information which is relevant to the exercise
of the protected freedoms of expressions?
The Court chose to reach, rather than ignore, this question in Zemel.
It did so despite a challenge to the intent of Congress to authorize such
((area restrictions" which was based upon the same conflicting conten44. 22 C.F.R. § 51.75 (1965).

45. State Dep't Reg. 108.456, 26 Fed. Reg. 482, issued Jan. 16, 1961. The restriction
was effected by the removal of Cuba from the areas to which a passport was not a necessary
prerequisite. Thereafter, the State Department issued no further passports to Cuba except
in certain exceptional cases.
46. See note 8 and notes 13 & 14 supra with their accompanying text.

47. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
48. This exception is implied from the discretion withheld by the Secretary in § 53.3(h)
of State Dep't Reg. 22 Fed. Reg. 10787, 10836, issued Dec. 27, 1957. See discussion in Note,
Passport Refusals for Political Reasons, 61 YALE L.J. 181, 192-194 (1952).
49. The assertion is strikingly similar to the assertion of Mr. Kent. See text at 118 sura.
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tions as the similar challenge in Kent v. Dulles.Y° Distinguishing these
area restrictions from the personal restriction placed before it in Kent,
the Court found more evidence to support the contentions of the Secretary than it had chosen to find there. 5'
Having thus disposed of the objection to the imposition of the area
restriction, the Court turned its attention to the due process challenge
and found it lacking. Its analysis in this regard was heavily colored by
an apparent concern over the foreign policy overtones of these restrictions. The history of these impositions was felt to be highly reflective
of their significance to' the conduct of foreign policy. Added to this concern was the legislation calling upon the President to "use such means,
not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to
secure the release of an American citizen unjustly deprived of his liberty
by a foreign government." 2 Such an incident might well develop out of
travel to Cuba, reasoned the Court, and thus it concluded its consideration of the due process objection by declaring
that the Secretary has justifiably concluded that travel to Cuba
by American citizens might involve the nation in dangerous
international incidents, and that the Constitution does not require him to validate passports for such travel. 3
Only when finished with all of these other questions, did the Court
turn its attention to the First Amendment argument of Mr. Zemel. The
significance of its conclusions in this regard are of such vital importance
that they are here set out in full:
Appellant also asserts that the Secretary's refusal to validate his passport for travel to Cuba denies him rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. His claim is different from that
which was raised in Kent v. Dulles, supra, and Apthecker v.
Secretary of State, supra, for the refusal to validate appellant's
passport does not result from any expression or association on
his part; appellant is not being forced to choose between membership in an organization and freedom to travel. Appellant's
allegation is, rather, that the "travel ban is a direct interference with the First Amendment rights of citizens to travel
abroad so that they might acquaint themselves at firsthand
50. This writer has been unable to convince himself that the matter was dictated more
by compelling weight of history than by a simple matter of choice.
51. The area restriction undoubtedly does have a far more substantial historical foundation than did the Communist discrimination presented in the Kent case. Area restrictions
have been imposed, for whatever reasons, in almost every instance of armed conflict which
occurred during the course of our nation's history. Often it was employed when the United
States was not even a combatant. The Court's opinion contains a rather thorough presentation of these instances. 381 U.S. at -, 85 S. Ct. at 1276-1278. But this writer questions
whether there was not sufficient evidence to have objectively sustained the government's
contentions in Kent.
52. 22 U.S.C. 1732 (1965).
53. 381 U.S. at -, 85 S. Ct. at 1280.
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with the effects abroad of our Government's. policies, foreign
and domestic, and with conditions abroad which might affect
such policies." We must agree that the Secretary's refusal to
validate passports for Cuba renders less than wholly free the
flow of information concerning that country. While we further
agree that this is a factor to be considered in determining whether
appellant has been denied due process of law, we cannot accept
the contention of appellant that it is a First Amendment right
which is involved. For to the extent that the Secretary's refusal
to validate passports for Cuba acts as an inhibition (and it
would be unrealistic to assume that it does not), it is an inhibition of action. There are few restrictions on action which could
not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased
data flow. For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry
into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to
gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the
way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into
the White House a First Amendment right. The right to speak
carry with it the unrestrained right to
and publish does not
54
gather information.

This position was not announced without opposition from Mr.
Justice Douglas, author of the majority opinion in Kent and of a specially concurring opinion in Apthecker. In Kent, it will be recalled, the
Justice spoke in terms which indicated consideration of First Amendment interests, if they did not speak to the Amendment directly. In
Apthecker, he still skirted the edge of the First Amendment. In Zemel,
Justice Douglas chose to be more explicative.
Referring to Kent v. Dulles, as an opinion which "reflected a judgment as to peripheral rights of the citizen under the First Amendment,""
the Justice spoke directly to that periphery:
The right to know, to converse with others, to consult with
them, to observe social, physical, political and other phenomena
abroad as well as at home gives meaning and substance to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Without those
contacts, First Amendment rights suffer. 6
To Mr. Justice Douglas, the majority was declaring the American society
immature, for it permitted an administrative official to determine for
the citizenry where they may go, and thus to a substantial extent, what
they should see, hear and know. While his high regard for this preexpressional value of travel expressly admitted of some limitation, i.e.,
war or pestilence, he contended that the denial of the freedom of travel
54. Id. at -, 85 S. Ct. at 1280-1281. The Court's response to this question is strikingly
similar to the government's response to this same argument made by Apthecker, that response appearing in the Brief of Secretary of State at 56, supra note 36.
55. Id. at -, 85 S. Ct. at 1284.
56. Id. at -, 85 S. Ct. at 1284.
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to certain areas on grounds other than these should be declared violative
of the principle that governmental regulations may not "sweep unneces' 57
sarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas was, however, a dissent, and
there has been no subsequent determination made by the Court in the
area of travel restrictions since the Zemel case. Yet, there remains much
food for thought in the expressions of Mr. Douglas. The conclusion of
this article will direct itself to those thoughts. Before coming to that
discussion, however, there remains one additional case, in another area
of the law, for examination.
B. The Right to Receive the Mail
1.

GENERAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The last of the three cases of principle attention is Lamont v. Postmaster General,5 8 which, as may be indicated by the case name, was
concerned with the constitutionality of an exercise of postal power by
the Postmaster General. In fine, the petition which was presented to the
Court placed in issue the constitutionality of the detention by the Postmaster of communist political propaganda addressed to the petitioner.
As in the previous discussion of the passport restriction cases, a general
historical analysis of this area is an important prerequisite to an understanding of the issues.
Federal involvement in the carriage of the mails was one early extension of the government into a previously private sector of activity.
The power to legislate in this area was specifically allocated to the Congress as one of its enumerated powers.59 But as with all of the Congressional powers, enumerated or implied, the exercise of that power is subject to the limitations set forth elsewhere in the Constitution.
It must be recognized at the outset that the postal power admits of
at least two aspects. There is, of course, the power to enter the area at
all. This was never in question; the Constitution was too explicit. The
problems arose out of the second aspect, the implicit "police" power to
regulate that over which the Constitution delegated authority.
Congressional exercise of this power to police the mails is similarly
subject to a dichotomy. It is one thing to regulate the materials going
57. Id. at -, 85 S. Ct. at 1286, citing NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
Moreover, he more lucidly characterized the interest as one of clear First Amendment import,
indeed, free speech import, although he did qualify that characterization by declaring the
rights as "at the periphery of the First Amendment, rather than at its core, largely because
travel is, of course, more than speech: it is speech brigaded with conduct." Id. at -, 85

S. Ct. at 1286.
58. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
59. "The Congress Shall have Power . . . to establish Post Offices and post Roads."
U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 7.
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through the mail as to their size, classifications, or potential danger they
present to the physical welfare of the postal employees handling the
mail. It is quite another matter to regulate the mail as to moral, political,
or other societal considerations which touch upon the substance of the
communication. Again, there has been little in the way of controversy
with the first type of regulation. The bulk of the constitutional challenges
have been directed at the Congressional and administrative exercises of
the second type of policing power. The remainder of this section will
concern itself with this second type of power, the regulations placed
upon the content of the communications. Thus where "police power" is
subsequently spoken of, it is with reference to this type of power.
The first comprehensive regulations of this nature were enacted in
the mid-1860's 6 ° and written into the first comprehensive postal code
in 1872." The approach taken by these initial statutes was to declare
both obscene and fraudulent communications "non-mailable matter,"
thereby making it unlawful for someone to use the mails to transmit
such matter.
The first challenge to these provisions was placed before the Court
in the case of Ex parte Jackson, 2 in 1878. Counsel for the petitioner,
who had been convicted of sending lotteries through the mails, argued
before the Court along these lines:
Our proposition, broadly stated is this, that Congress has no
power to prohibit the transmission of intelligence, public or private, through the mails; and any statute which distinguishes
mailable from unmailable matter merely by the nature of the
intelligence offered for transmission is an unconstitutional enactment.68
While the Court did sustain the constitutionality of the statute in question, 4 it chose to accompany that determination with a clearly delineated
policy to govern the procedures which could be constitutionally employed to enforce any legitimate exercise of this type of postal power.
At the outset, the Court made it clear that it would remain consistent
with the common law prohibition against prior restraints, and thus would
only sustain a statute aimed at punishing a past violation. Moreover,
60. A statute characterizing obscene matter as non-mailable was enacted in 1865. Act
of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 89, § 16, 13 Stat. 507. A similar provision with respect to lotteries and
other fraudulent matter followed two years later. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 346, § 13, 15
Stat. 196.
61. Act of June 8, 1872, 17 Stat. 238, 302.
62. 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
63. As reported in the Rose edition of 24 L. Ed. 877 (1878).
64. "The [postal] power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire
postal system of the country. The right to designate what shall be carried, necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be excluded." lx parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 729
(1878).
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the enforcement procedures could not encompass an effective prior restraint by the implementation of abusive methods of detection of the
violations.
Sealed letters, declared the Court, were of a sufficiently private
and personal nature as to fall under the umbrella of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.6 5 Thus, in
order to investigate sealed letters for violations of the non-mailable provisions, the postal department would first have to obtain a warrant to
search the particular letter in question. In order to do that, the authorities would have to establish probable cause.
The other half of the dichotomy dealt with open, usually printed
matter. The Court set forth the rules governing their examination in
these terms:
Nor can any regulations be enforced against the transportation of printed matter in the mail, which is open to examination, so as to interfere in any manner with the freedom of the
press. Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as
liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the pub6
lication would be of little value.1
The statement leaves open little in the way of conjecture as to the applicability of the First Amendment as a limitation on the police postal
power. And, while the language itself seems directly to invoke only the
freedom of the press aspect of the First Amendment, there seems to be
little reason to suspect that the direct invocation of that particular aspect was intended indirectly to suggest inapplicability of any other.
The dichotomies set forth in the Jackson decision provided a rather
long lasting basis for problem analysis. In the years and cases which
followed, there was little in the way of really significant deviation in
problem solving. Indeed two latter challenges to these same lottery
statutes which swiftly followed the Jackson case added little more than
a strengthening of the postal police power in that area. 7
65. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .
U.S. CONST., amend.
IV. (Emphasis added.)
66. Id. at 733. (Emphasis added.)
67. In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497
(1904). The Public Clearing House decision does give, however, an interesting insight into

the Court's view of the role played by the postal service at that stage of our nation's history.
We find no difficulty in sustaining the constitutionality of these sections. The
postal service is by no means an indispensable adjunct to a civil government, and
for hundreds, if not thousands, of years the transmission of private letters was either
entrusted to the hands of friends or to private enterprise. Indeed, it is only within
the last three hundred years that governments have undertaken the work of transmitting intelligence as a branch of their general administration.
It is not however a necessary part of the civil government in the same sense
in which the protection of life, liberty, and property, the defense of the government
against insurrection and foreign invasion, and the administration of public justice
are; but it is a public function assumed and established by the Congress for the
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For that matter, there is little of any significance to our discussion
in the bulk of the cases which subsequently challenged those exercises
of the postal police power which were aimed at restricting the use of
the mails on moral grounds. There have been, to be sure, evaluations
of certain niceties of the exercise, such as the extent to which the Court
will review an adjudication made by the Postmaster General,68 or the
degree to which the gradations of privileged "classes" of mails may be
utilized to give latitude to the police power,6 9 but little of any First
Amendment significance developed in the later cases.70
general welfare . . . and . . . operates as a popular and efficient method of taxation. Indeed, this seems to have been originally the purpose of Congress. The legislative body in thus establishing a postal service may annex such conditions as it
chooses. Id. at 506.
Compare the above view with the modern perspective set forth in Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 504 n.5 (1957):
The hoary dogma of Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, . . .and Public Clearing
House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, . . . that the use of the mails is a privilege on which
the Government may impose such conditions as it chooses, has long since evaporated. See Brandeis, J., dissenting in Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co.
v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 430-433, . . .Holmes, J., dissenting in Leach v. Carlile,
258 U.S. 138, 140, . . .; Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804, . . . reversing 7 Cir.,
189 F.2d 369; Door v. Donaldson, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 188, 195 F.2d 764.
68. E.g., Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921); Leach v. Carlile, 258
U.S. 138 (1922); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing, 241 F.2d 772 (9th
Cir. 1957); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing, 249 F.2d
114 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
In this regard the earlier cases established the view under which review was limited to
ascertaining whether the determination of the Postmaster General was supported by "substantial evidence" in the record. There is some question, however, as to whether this view
still obtains generally. In the Manual Enterprises decision the Court, presented with an

obscenity statute, reviewed the record de novo and established that at least as regards the
"obscenity" cases, the matter is one for the determination of the Supreme Court in each
instance. Whether this same de novo consideration will be employed in other areas of postal
regulation remains to be seen. On the one hand we have the knowledge that the obscenity
matter is relatively peculiar in this respect; but on the other hand we have the rather broad
language employed by the Court in that decision, as it quoted from Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Milwaukee Publishing:
The United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries
it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to
use our tongues, and it would take very strong language to convince me that Congress ever intended to give such a practically despotic power to any one man.
Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) as quoted in Manual
Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 499 (1962).
69. E.g., Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921); Hannegan v. Esquire,
Inc., 327 US. 146 (1946) ; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). Generally speaking,
the classification of mail as to types and commensurate rates is an effective tool. The difficulty of determination in this particular area stems not only from the indirectness of the
tool, but from its ramifications on opposing interests of society as well. Consider this
admonition by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Hannegan, supra at 159:
It seems to me important to confine discussion in this case because its radiations

touch, on the one hand, the very basis of a free society, that of the right of expres-

sion beyond the conventions of the day, and on the other hand, the freedom of

society from constitutional compulsion to subsidize enterprise, whether in the world

of matter or the mind. While one may entirely agree with Mr. Justice Holmes in
Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 140, as to the extent to which the First Amendment

forbids control of the post so far as sealed letters are concerned, one confronts an
entirely different set of questions in considering the basis on which the Government

may grant or withhold subsidies through low postal rates, and huge subsidies, if
one is to judge by the glimpse afforded by the present case.
70. E.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178 (1948); and cases cited in notes
68 and 69, supra.
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There was, however, one development of considerable import for
our discussion which was brought out in the early fraud, lottery and
obscenity cases. When the Congress had characterized these several
types of matter as "non-mailable," the assumption enunciated by the
Court in Jackson was that the effect of a violation of these provisions
was conviction after, and as a result of, the violation and not that of a
prior restraint.7 ' The Postmaster General apparently developed a different view. When he chose to implement this viewpoint, an interesting
question arose as to the nature of the interest which he invaded.72 An
answer to this question will be reexamined as part of the historical development of the right to acquisition of a communication.
2.

RESTRAINT AGAINST POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS

The outbreak of military conflict in the early twentieth century
led the Congress into a more thoughtful examination of the postal power
as a potential means of defending against resistance to the war effort. 71
As a result, in 1917, Congress chose to include among the provisions of
the Espionage Act, 74 a section providing for the withdrawal of the privilege of participation in lower cost, second-class mailing rates from those
publications which had attempted to publish matter which the Congress
felt might be inimical to the war effort. 75 The financial effect of this
71. See text at 129 supra.
72. The "nature of the interest invaded" is here used to describe that which is the
precise subject matter of this paper. It is sincerely felt that little would be accomplished
by a major discussion of the point at this stage of the paper.
It might be pointed out, however, that Mr. Holmes, dissenting, to the opinion in Leach
v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 140 (1922) (wherein the Court sustained an order stopping the
use of the mails for certain fraudulent purposes) declared:
[I]t seems to me that the First Amendment in terms forbid such control of the
post as was exercised here. I think it abridged freedom of speech on the part of the
sender of the letters and that the appellant [addressee] had such an interest in the
exercise of the right that he could avail himself of it in this case.
It is with the hypothetical assertion suggested by Mr. Justice Holmes that this paper deals:
the right, under the First Amendment, to receive expressions as well as to express them.
73. It is interesting, in this regard, to note that the first attempt to enact a regulation
of the subject matter of communication through the mail was initiated by President Jackson,
and was directed at certain abolitionist propaganda-thus a politically motivated attempt.
The attempt failed to pass the Senate, due for the most part to the issue of state's rights
as championed by Senator John Calhoun of South Carolina. A fascinating account of those
early discussions and developments is presented by Deutch, Freedom of the Press and of the
Mails, 36 MicH. L. REv. 703 (1938).
74. Titled the National Defense Law of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 217. The specific provision in point was Title XII of the Act, infra note 75.
75. The Congress was rather inclusive in its description of those things which would
be inimical to the war effort:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false
reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of
the military or naval forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its
enemies . . . and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause
or attempt to cause, or incite or attempt to incite, insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or
shall willfully obstruct or attempt to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service
of the United States, and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully
utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language
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withdrawal was practically equivalent to placing the publication in the
non-mailable classification. Indeed, the statute did extend the power to
do just that to the particular issues containing such matter. 76
These provisions were swiftly brought before the Court in the
Milwaukee Free Press case. The case arose when the Postmaster General
determined, after an investigation, that the newspaper in question had,
over a period of time, published matter which the Espionage Act had
characterized as non-mailable. 77 Pursuant to that determination, he
chose to implement the provisions of the Act by removing the newspaper from the list of those entitled to the second-class mailing rate.
The Court determined that the conclusion of the Postmaster was
supported by substantial evidence in the record, and sustained the prospective removal without a great deal of apparent concern over any
possible First Amendment ramifications of either his action or the judicial determination." This disregard was more than adequately subjected
to attack by Justice Brandeis, who was joined in dissent by Justice
Holmes.79 Their analysis of the issues is an outstanding example of
clarity and today is generally recognized as the more acceptable approach."
The subtlety of the device employed to punish the newspaper was
not acceptable to the minds of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. It did
not impress them that the newspaper could use the mails if it would only
about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the
United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of
the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States, or any
language intended to bring the form of government of the United States, or the
Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United
States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of
the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute, or shall willfully
utter, print, write, or publish any language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage
resistance to the United States, or to promote the cause of its enemies, or shall
willfully display the flag of any foreign enemy, or shall willfully by utterance,
writing, printing, publication, or language spoken, urge, incite, or advocate any
curtailment of production in this country of any thing or things, product or products, necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war in which the United States
may be engaged, with intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United
States in the prosecution of the war, and whoever shall willfully advocate, teach,
defend, or suggest the doing of any of the acts or things in this section enumerated,
and whoever shall by word or act support or favor the cause of any country with
which the United States is at war or by word or act oppose the cause of the United
States therein, . . . Ibid.
76. Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921). For a thorough critique
of this era and this case see CHAFEE, FRE SPlscH iN = UNITED STATEs 298-305 (1948).
77. 255 U.S. at 412.
78. Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 414 (1921):
Freedom of the press may protect criticism and agitation for modification or repeal
of laws, but it does not extend to protection of him who counsels and encourages
violation of the [draft] laws as it exists. The Constitution was adopted to preserve
our Government, not to serve as a screen for those who while claiming its privileges seek to destroy it.
79. Id. at 423-431.
80. E.g., see discussion from Roth v. United States, as presented in note 67 supra.
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pay the higher postage rate. Their response to the device was direct and
crushing.
In other words, the postal power, like all other powers is
subject to the limitations of the Bill of Rights. .

.

.Congress

may not through its postal power put limitations upon the freedom of the press which if directly attempted would be unconstitutional. This Court also stated in Ex parte Jackson, that,
"Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty
of publishing; indeed without the circulation the publication
will be of little value." It is argued that although a newspaper
is barred from the second-class mail, liberty of circulation is
not denied; because the first and third-class mail and also other
means of transportation are open to a publisher. Constitutional
rights should not be frittered away by arguments so technical
and unsubstantial. "The Constitution deals with substance, not
shadows. Its inhibition was leveled at the thing, not the name."
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325.1
Yet despite the piercing language and analysis of the dissenters,
they were dissenters nonetheless. Prior to the Lamont decision in 1965,
the rule of the Milwaukee Press case was still to some degree in effect.
Briefly summarized, the holding of the Milwaukee Press case was significant in these respects:
1. It sustained the power of the Congress to extend its postal
police power into the area of political expression, without
effective First Amendment restriction.
2. It sustained the exercise of that power by the PostmasterGeneral, and limited its review of his determination of the
statute's applicability to a test of "substantial evidence." 2
3. It sustained the use of a prospective restraint on this type
of political expression, thus overruling the preclusion of
prior restraints announced in the Jackson case.
With such an endorsement, it is not surprising that the intervening
years has seen a further exercise of the police power in the area of political communications by both the Congress and the Postal Department.8
The extensiveness of those efforts played no small part in the determination of the issues in Lamont v. Postmaster.4
81. Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, supra note 78, at 430-431.
82. See discussion note 68 supra.
83. A thorough examination of the more modern developments in governmental control
over political matter sent through the mails is presented in Schwartz, The Mail Must Not
Go Through-Propagandaand Pornography, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 805 (1964) to which the
Court referred in its decision in Lamont, our chief case under examination. For other interesting accounts of the early and modern history of such regulations see Deutch, Freedom of
the Press and of the Mails, 36 MicH. L. REv. 703 (1938); Note, Government Exclusion of
Foreign Political Propaganda,68 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1955).
84. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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3. Lamont:

A RESPITE FROM REJECTION

In 1962, the Congress added a rider to the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act 5 which gave specific statutory authorization
to a practice already effectuated by both the Postal and Customs departments." The provision authorized the Postmaster General to detain
mail matter, other than sealed letters, which originated outside of the
United States and was addressed to someone inside the United States,
if the Secretary of the Treasury determined that such mailed matter was
"communist political propaganda." '
In 1963, a copy of the Peking Review # 12 which had been addressed to Dr. Corliss Lamont 8 was detained pursuant to the 1962 provision and the rules and regulations promulgated by the Treasury
Department to enforce that provision.8 Those rules called for the notification of the recipient that mailed matter addressed to him was being
detained because it had been classified as communist political propaganda.
The notification included a postcard, which called for an indication
of the addressee's intentions regarding the detained matter.
The addressee was offered several alternatives. He could disregard
the whole affair, in which case the matter would be destroyed. He could
indicate that he did not wish to receive such matter then or ever in the
future, in which case that intention would be respected and administered.
He could indicate that he would like to receive this particular matter,
85. § 305(a), 76 Stat. 840, 39 U.S.C. § 4008(a).
86. The practices of both departments is well documented and thoroughly examined in
Schwartz, The Mail Must Not Go Through-Propagandaand Pornography, 11 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 805, 806-816 (1964) and Note, Government Exclusion of Foreign Political Propaganda,
68 HARv. L. REV. 1393-1402 (1952).
87. The Postmaster was to be guided in this determination by the definition of Communist political propaganda set forth in § 1(j) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938, 52 Stat. 631, 22 U.S.C. § 611(j):
The term "political propaganda" includes any oral, visual, graphic, written,
pictorial, or other communication or expression by any person (1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or which
he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way
influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with
reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government
of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign
policies of the United States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or
social dissensions, or (2) which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial,
social, political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use
of force or violence in any other American republic or the overthrow of any government or political subdivision of any other American republic by any means involving the use of force or violence.
88. Just as an interesting sidelight, it is noteworthy that Dr. Lamont is among those
to whom the Secretary of State had denied a passport prior to the Kent case. For a discussion of his problems in that regard, see Comment, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons,
61 YALE L.J. 171, 177 (1952). This is the same Professor Corliss Lamont who became a
cause celebr6 when he refused to co-operate with the McCarthy Committee in the early
1950's. That story is the subject of a book. WrrTENERO, TnE LAMONT CASE (1957).
89. The precise procedures employed were fully set forth in the lower court's opinion.
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 229 F. Supp. 913, 915-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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and he might even choose to indicate that he would like to receive all
such matter in the future. By electing either of these two latter alternatives, he would get the mail, and the Post Office officials would place his
name on a list of other persons with similar reading habits.
Dr. Corliss Lamont chose another alternative, not offered to him.
He instituted suit to enjoin the enforcement of the provision in question,
challenging it as an infringement of his rights under the First Amendment." The postal department responded by a series of maneuvers intended to moot his plea,9' but the cause was nonetheless placed before
the Supreme Court for its determination in May of 1965.92
The opinion is highly noteworthy, not only for the extent to which
it brought the postal regulations into the perspective of modem constitutional concepts, but for the degree to which it affirmatively responded
to a request for a protectible First Amendment interest in the acquisition of information.
Mr. Justice Douglas was, significantly, the author of the majority
opinion. 8 His primary contention was that the act was invalid because
it required a prior affirmative act for the exercise of a First Amendment
right. Pointing to a series of cases in which such prior affirmative obligations had been similarly stricken,94 the Justice saw little difficulty applying the principle to the right of the addressee to receive the Peking
Review:

The regime of this Act is at war with the "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" debate and discussion that are contemplated
by the First Amendment.9
Yet, strangely enough, Justice Douglas, who in his prior opinions,
had so clearly related the right of travel to the First Amendment, was
curiously imprecise as to the basis for characterizing the addressee's
right as a First Amendment right. His verbalized attention to the ques90. Id.

91. Upon notice of his suit, the Postmaster informed him that they regarded the
institution of the litigation as an indication of his intention to receive the mail, and were
forwarding it to him. Upon that set of circumstances, the District Court declared the issues
moot, and dismissed his complaint. Ibid. A similar complaint was filed by a Mr. Heilberg
in California, but the District Court there refused to give the same effect to the manipulations of the Postal Department, and upon the merits, held the practice unconstitutional.
Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1964). The decision in the Lamont case was
an appeal of both of these cases.
92. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
93. The reader will recall Mr. Justice Douglas' opinions in the travel cases.
94. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (license tax on labor organizing activities);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (license tax on the distribution of religious
literature); Lowell v. City of Griffith, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (license for literature distribution). Also cited was a recent voter registration case in which the Court struck down a
registration requirement imposed in lieu of a prior poll tax requirement which the Twentyfourth amendment had barred. Harman v. Forsenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
95. Lamont v. Postmaster General, supra note 92, at -, 85 S. Ct. at 1486.
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tion was brief. The limited language, directing itself to this characterization, seemed to be based upon the idea that a communication of ideas
was already in progress once the Peking Review was mailed.96 In this
perspective, the detention was an abridgement of a protectible expression, already in progress.
Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring views were more explicit.
[T]he addressees assert First Amendment claims in their own
right: they contend that the Government is powerless to interfere with the delivery of the material because the First Amendment "necessarily protects the right to receive it." Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143. Since the decisions
today uphold
97
this contention, I join the Court's opinion.
To Mr. Justice Brennan, the matter was one of access to publications,
and if there was to be a meaningful interpretation of the Bill of Rights, it
must necessarily be extended so as to encompass the rights to receive
the protected expressions.
The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise
willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them.
It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers
and no buyers.98
Yet regardless of who verbalized the concept, one thing becomes
clear. The argument that had been ignored in Apthecker and rejected
in Zemel had been used as the ratio decendi in Lamont. There was a protectible First Amendment interest in the receipt of expressions. From
such a flow of cases, more questions than answers arise.
III.

THE NATURE OF THE INTEREST

A. An Introduction
The First Amendment guarantee of the freedom of expression has
been a part of the American governmental structure since the beginning
of our existence under the Constitution. It was an addendum of critical
import for the democratic form of government. As Alexander Meiklejohn stated:
The principle of freedom of speech springs from the necessity
of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason
in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal sufferage .... "I Free men need the truth as they need nothing else. 100
96. "The Act sets administrative officials astride the flow of mail .... " Id. at -,
85 S. Ct. at 1496.
97. Id. at -, 85 S. Ct. at 1497.
98. Id. at -, 85 S. Ct. at 1497.
99. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDom 27 (Ist ed. 1960).

100. Id. at 59.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

Reading this eloquent truism in the perspective of these three recent
decisions invokes a series of questions each of which requires a response.
First, to what extent, if any, did previous decisions recognize the
interests raised in these three cases? Second, to what extent, if any, did
these cases affect these prior holdings? Third, what can be said of the
import of these cases for those, who as students, practitioners or as interested citizens, attempt to evaluate the status of our protection under the
First Amendment?
Before turning to the response to our triparte query, it would be
well to define more clearly the interest under consideration. In one
sense, the arguments of Messrs. Apthecker, Zemel and Lamont are a
unity. Each of them called for an extension of the protected area of
the First Amendment; each argued that there is a protectible interest
in the acquisition of expression. But the attempt to summarize their
arguments into a single one must end there. Once the examination extends into analysis of the nature of the particular methods, or into the
stage of, or justification for the acquisition, it becomes readily apparent
that their contentions are clearly capable of being distinguished, each
from the other.
Mr. Lamont asked only that he be allowed passively to receive the
communication, unfettered by prior restraints in the form of administrative impositions of a prior affirmative act. Mr. Apthecker asked that
he be allowed to travel abroad both for the purpose of communicating
while abroad and for the purpose of making observations which would
provide him with a basis for future communications in the United
States. Mr. Zemel asked only that he be allowed to travel abroad to acquire a basis for determining his position on certain political questions
relating to the conduct of our relations with Cuba.
Thus it becomes apparent that the First Amendment aspects of
these three cases are at once similar and dissimilar. If a term were to
be ascribed to the ensuing analysis of both the substance of each and
its relation to the others, it would be that the analysis will necessarily
be interwoven.
B. The PriorExtent of Recognition
While it is probably true that the Lamont opinion was the first
specifically to rest its decision upon a clear recognition of a protectible
First Amendment interest in the receipt of expression, it is nevertheless a
fact that a handful of prior decisions contained language which suggested
the existence of such an interest.
As far back as 1923, Justices Holmes and Brandeis, dissenting in the
postal regulation case of Leach v. Carlile, suggested in dissent and dicta
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that the addressee of detained mail might have an interest to assert against
the Postmaster arising out of the detention. 101 That such a recognition
did not arise earlier in judicial history may be explained by the recent
comment of Justice Brennan that, "the Supreme Court's concern with
the true significance of the first amendment has been primarily confined
to the last fifty years. That is not a long time in the history of constitutional interpretation . . *.
."1o Moreover, even the most forceful advocate
of the recognition of first amendment interests of the nature asserted here
would be hard pressed to deny that the recognition could be effected by
anything less than a significant extension of the existing interpretation of
the language of the First Amendment, and that such an extension would
not arise out of the usual First Amendment fact pattern.
This is not to say that prior to the utterance of any protectible
expression there are not efforts on the part of the communicator whereby
he attempts to secure the information which will form the foundation
for his expression. Nor does it mean that there is not an intended recipient
of every expression. What this does mean is that the cases are rare and
unusual which do not present a direct, assertable interest on the part of
one expressing himself which provide adequate protection for the free
flow of the expression. So long as the existent, recognized interests are
adequate to protect those expressions, just so long will the Court refrain
from needlessly extending their interpretations. And there is much to
support the view that the need had not been adequately demonstrated
prior to these past two terms of the Court. 8
In partial illustration, it should be noted that, as in the Leach case,
all of the language in previous decisions had only been directed at the type
of abuse against which Lamont complained; none, however, saw fit to
extend even tacit recognition to the types of interest which Apthecker
and Zemel asserted.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, °4 for instance, the Court considered as one
of the factors in its ratio decendi, the deprival of the "opportunities of
pupils to acquire knowledge ....
105 But that opportunity was not the
active search for, or procuring of, information; it was rather the passive
receipt of knowledge in the characteristic teacher-pupil relationship. The
101. 258 U.S. 138, 141 (1922).

See discussion note 72 supra.

102. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1. (1965).
103. Even the commentators who had called for a judicial response to this problem
were not fully assured of the Court's inclination to significantly alter its prior doctrines in

order to frame a remedy. E.g., Note, Government Exclusion of Foreign Political Propaganda,
68 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1955). The great barrier was that there was no recognized right of
receipt prior to Lamont, and the doctrine was generally followed that one party would not
be heard to assert the constitutional rights of another. Ibid. But see Barrows v. Jackson,
346 US. 249, 257 (1953).
104. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
105. Id. at 401.
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subsequent instances of such language have been even more clearly confined to the passive receipt asserted by Lamont rather than active procurement which Zemel and Apthecker asserted.
Such was clearly the case in Martin v. Struthers.'016 The Court
declared that the freedom of the press encompasses not only the right to
circulate, but "necessarily protects the right to receive it."'' Easily as
clear was the declaration in Thomas v. Collins,"°8 which held a prior
registration requirement placed upon a labor organizer, was a "restriction
upon Thomas' right to speak and the right of the workers to hear what he
had to say."'0 9 Still another example, and the last instance of this sort of
consideration prior to the Lamont decision was the weighing of interests
presented in the opinion of the Court in Marsh v. Alabama." °
In Marsh, it will be recalled, the restraint on expression was contended to be private, rather than public. After characterizing the company-town as sufficiently public to be within the contemplation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court amplified that analysis with this
language which touched upon the nature of the societal interest which
might be invaded were such towns not so characterized:
Many people in the United States live in company-owned
towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free
citizens of their State and county. Just as all other citizens, they
must make decisions which affect the welfare of the community
and nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed. In
order to enable them to be properly informed their information
must be uncensored."'
Thus, if a summary is to be made of the language in decisions prior
to these past two terms of the Supreme Court, it is that there was verbal,
if not decisional, recognition of some sort of a protectible First Amendment interest on the part of an intended recipient of a protectible expression. The summary is susceptible of even more definitive analysis.
There can be little doubt but that the decisions themselves provided a
clearer basis for the recognition of the right of passive unfettered receipt,
as asserted by Mr. Lamont, than they did for the recognition of the
active acquisition of pre-expressional information, as asserted by Messrs.
Apthecker and Zemel. More will be said of this rather epherial dichotomy
in the concluding remarks.
106. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
107. Id. at 143.
108. 323 U.S. 519 (1945).
109. Id. at 534. (Emphasis added.)
110. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
111. Id. at 508. Cf. Grossjean v. American Press Co., 279 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
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C. The Affect of these Three Cases
Placed in that historical perspective, at least one of the three decisions was relatively predictable. 2 In Lamont v. Postmaster General, the
Court made unequivocal what had been suggestion and dicta in a number
of earlier decisions by resting its decision upon the existence of a protectible First Amendment interest in the unfettered receipt of protectible
expressions. Yet, the fact that this decision was not altogether novel does
not dictate that its import is to be casually regarded. The importance of
Lamont to the protection of the freedom of expression is at least twofold.
There is, of course, the highly significant elevation of the right to receive &
communication to the status of a decisional holding. The other point of
significance is the effect of the extension of this new substantive right.
Prior to the Lamont decision, the invasion of a protectible expression could be contested only by the person who was doing the expressing: the speaker, the publisher and the organizer. The person on the
receiving end of these expressions was precluded from challenging the
invasion. He had no standing to do so, and the well-settled rule was, and
is, that one person will not be heard to assert the constitutional objections
of another.
Lamont significantly alters this. By recognizing an assertible interest
in the recipient of the expression, the Court has substantially altered the
number of parties who can contest the alleged invasion, and have thereby
afforded greater assurance that those invasions will be subject to attack.
Thus, unless subsequent decisions significantly limit the effect of the
Lamont holding, every subsequent invasion of the freedom of expression
will be open to attack from two classes of citizens-the expressor and the
recipient.
As previously indicated, however, the extension effected by Lamont
was preceded by two other decisions which refused to extend the effective
scope of the freedom of expression to the acquisition of pre-expressional
information. Thus one cannot read the Lamont extension other than in
light of the limitations expressed by Zemel and Apthecker. Read together,
the three cases outline a somewhat limited, perhaps confusingly limited,
extension of the scope of the protection afforded the individual and society
by the provisions of the First Amendment. The state of confusion arises
out of alternative constructions one can place upon the opinions in the
two travel cases.
112. Two articles, written well before the Lamont decision, had proposed as one of
several solutions to the dilemma of the addressee who was without standing to contest an
invasion of the First Amendment under the existent construction of that Amendment, that
he be granted a First Amendment interest of his own to assert. See Note, Government
Exclusion of Foreign Political Propaganda,68 HARv. L. Rxv. 1393, 1405 (1952); Schwartz,
The Mail Must Not Go Through-Propagandaand Pornography, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 805,
824 (1964).
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It is, on the one hand, quite possible to construe narrowly the two
travel cases by rationalizing them as examples of the Court's persistent
deference to the executive branch in areas touching upon the conduct of
foreign affairs."' But in the view of this writer, this perspective is unfortunately less than fully justified. The breadth of the language with which
the Court announced its refusal is inconsistent with that limited perspective. Yet even if such a viewpoint could be otherwise justified, the
opinion would be no more satisfactory. The characterization of travel as a
Fifth Amendment liberty, totally devoid of any First Amendment significance is a characterization totally devoid of any appreciation of the
apparent societal interests in allowing our citizens to travel outside the
United States. And the Court, in Kent v. Dulles,..4 had already paid at
least lip service to those societal considerations.
It would not be unduly repetitious to here re-focus our attention
upon the competing interest in First Amendment perspective of freedom
of travel. We have said that the First Amendment is protective of both the
individual interest and the societal interest. 1 5 At least as far as international travel to secure information is concerned, that statement is
substantially a platitude. The interest is overwhelmingly societal; so
much so that any decision which would weigh the rights of the claimant
as if they were purely or predominately individual could be characterized
as shortsighted.
Consider Zemel. Even assuming that the Court should have defined
a First Amendment interest, it could not have properly restricted its
weighing test to his individual interest. To the extent that it is an interest
devoid of reference to his role as a voter, it is not really a First Amendment interest. And to the extent that it does have a referent in the role
of Zemel as a citizen, that is clearly a societal interest. Zemel's interest in
113. The Court has long deferred to the executive as a matter of its considered view
of the exigencies in the conduct of foreign affairs. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 319-322 (1936). It is not the suggestion of this writer that that view should
be totally abandoned. Rather, the assertion is that the foreign policy power, like all power
under the Constitution, must necessarily be subject to those limitations as are consistent with
the preservation of the democratic concept. This comment presents the thesis that the right
of acquisition of information should be one such limitation.
114. 357 U.S. 114 (1958).
115. Consider this analysis presented by Professor Chafee in FREE SPEECH IN THE CONsTITrUTON (1941) at 33:
The First Amendment protects two kinds of interests in free speech. There is the
individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital
to them if life is to be worth living, and a societal interest in the attainment of
truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry
it out in the wisest way. This social interest is especially important in wartime.
Even after war has been declared there is bound to be a confused mixture of good
and bad arguments in its support and a wide difference of opinion as to its objects.
Truth can be sifted out from falsehood only if the government is vigorously and
constantly cross-examined, so that the fundamental issues of the struggle may be
clearly defined, and the war may not be diverted to improper ends, or conducted
with an undue sacrifice of life and liberty, or prolonged after its just purposes are
accomplished.
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resolving his own convictions about United States policy as regards Cuba
was coextensive with his desire for a governmental policy congruent with
his conviction. That remains true regardless of whether or not he, as
Apthecker, intended to express himself on the basis of his observations
upon his return to the United States. From the electorate's standpoint, the
interests to be afforded protection were the process of prior thought and
subsequent expression, evidenced at the polls or in debates. All those
interests are replete with the societal overtones of the First Amendment.
Yet the societal implications are even more extensive than may have
been made apparent by the preceding extrapolation from Zemel's experience. If the State Department had the authority to restrict Zemel from
going to a given area, then what is to stop its assertion of that same power
to exclude any other American from any other area? Certainly, nothing
in the opinion suggests any possible basis for a limitation on this power.
And that power could prove to be a highly effective prior restraint on the
free flow of information. A restraint of this kind can only serve to heighten
the extent to which public opinion in the critical area of foreign policy
can be molded by a government directed flow of information.
It is no answer at all to respond, as the Court impliedly responded,
that the newspapers are adequate guardians of the free flow of accurate
information. It is the function of the American press to stimulate, but not
to replace the responsibilities of the electorate itself.
The concept of representative government was never intended to
effect representation before choice; its object is representation after
choice. Thus, it is only after a full, free, intelligent debate that the
American citizen can legitimately delegate any of his responsibility to
another. No man and no official may compel one to cast a ballot or make a
choice of policy for another. Why then, should it be deemed any more
acceptable to tolerate a system which forces the same citizen with the
same responsibility of choice to rely upon another for the information
which is the basis of that choice? Yet that is clearly the practical effect
of a power to prohibit travel outside of the United States. Freedom of
discussion is already too greatly inhibited by forces beyond the control
of the law to tolerate an exercise of power which further inhibits that
vital aspect of our democratic society.
Nor can the determination in these cases be justified by a contention
that something different in the way of public participation is called for in
the area of foreign policy. This contention may be valid, but if so, its
validity is that the need for a full and intelligent public consideration in
the affairs of war and peace are far more critical than in any other aspect
of modern society. But even this analysis would be inadequate were attention not focused further upon the extent to which the Court, in these
decisions, shut the door on any hope for the rectification of this urgent
need.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

Discomfort with the Zemel and Apthecker opinions arises not because the Court did or did not preclude these two citizens from traveling
as they wished. In the broad sense, these results were relatively insignificant. The aspect of these opinions which this writer bemoans is
that the Court refused to find any First Amendment interest on the part
of a citizen who wishes to explore for himself the policy forum of an
American governmental decision.
If the Court had recognized an interest under the First Amendment,
and then determined that it was outweighed by an overwhelming governmental interest, the discomfort would have been substantially alleviated.
But it chose not to do so, and therein lies the really disturbing problem.
For by refusing to recognize that interest, the entire perspective of the
Justices was misdirected. It was misdirected in that it called for the
resolution of the issue of participation in decision making by the same
standard as if the issue was one of contract rights or farm legislation."'
It precludes the Court from taking the necessary overview of the societal
interests. The total question becomes whether it was a reasonable exercise
of the government's authority to restrict the activity of the complainant;
and the test is really one of any conceivable reasonable basis.
Thus viewed, the impact of these three decisions on previously existing law, and upon hopes for the future is at once constructive and yet
restrictive. While, for the first time, a person may now successfully protest
the imposition of a requirement of affirmative action as a prerequisite to
the passive receipt of a communication, there is no commensurate relief
available for the person who wishes to take affirmative action, but is
precluded from the acquisition by governmental restraints. In the
area of participation in the responsibilities of communication, the Court
has decreed that the more meek shall inherit the worth of the First
Amendment.
D. What of the Future?
It is the basic democratic thesis that the government operate only
by consent of the governed. More particularly, what is called for is active
116. Consider, for example, the Court's own language in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
519, 530 (1945), as it compared the standard of the due process clause to that of the First
Amendment:
[Tihe rational connection between the remedy provided for and the evil to be
curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against attack on due
process grounds will not suffice . . . . Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. It is therefore in our tradition to allow the widest room for discussion, and the narrowest range for restriction.
Certainly it is no answer at all for the Court to attempt to intermingle the two
standards as it did in Apthecker, see note 32 supra, and accompanying text. Such an approach first ignores, and then pays token homage to the position of the First Amendment.
It is thereby all the more invidious in its affect. For it might delude the reader, and perhaps
the Court itself, into the conclusion that the jealous standard of the First Amendment had
been satisfied.
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participation by the populace in the decision making processes of the
government. Where acquiescence replaces that participation, potential
tyranny cannot be far behind. Unfortunately, a multitude of factors,
personal and public, have substantially precluded or diminished active
participation by the American electorate in the vital and everyday determinations of our government. It is with a fearful eye on the implications
of that reality that this article is written.
It is certainly beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the innumerable factors which have contributed to this degeneration of participation. They are far too numerous, far too involved. Instead, the remainder of this article will be confined to an analysis of the three
decisions, discussed supra, as they represent a frustration, by the Supreme
Court, of one potentially positive response to this truly disturbing and
troublesome problem of our time.
The problem, once again, is the degree to which the increasing supervision of the government over the flow of information can effectively
preclude a basis for effective public debate of important issues. This
particular problem, as well as a good number of others which are not
considered here, were fully discussed by Professor Emerson of Yale in a
recent article dealing with the First Amendment in modern American
society." 7 Consider these observations:
Large scale and pervasive government, operating on a new
order of magnitude and function, poses greater and more subtle
threats to individual rights. . . . The exercise of authority in
many areas, imposing social controls which are acceptable in
themselves, tends in actual operation also to circumscribe freedom of expression. Perhaps most important, the danger of distorting legitimate powers for illegitimate purposes has become
acute....
Finally, the evolution of modern society has meant greater
participation by the government itself in political expression.
Widespread resort to direct coercion by the state is compatible
neither with a democratic society nor, in the long run, with
technological society. Modern government strives to achieve
unity and control more by the manipulation of public attitudes
and opinion than by direct application of official sanctions.
Hence, as the area of its control has expanded, the state's interest in affirmative measures of education, persuasion, and
manipulation has correspondingly increased. Such activities by
the state raise obvious problems for a system of free expression ....
8
117. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
(1963).
118. Id. at 901-902.
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All these developments have placed upon law and judicial
institutions a greater responsibility for the maintenance of a
system of freedom of expression." 9
This writer parts with Professor Emerson, however, in his views as
to the part that constitutional concepts can play in adjusting to these
new challenges. In the professor's view, the executive and political
branches are the chief source of remedy. "This is not an area where the
120
courts, applying first amendment doctrine, can be of much assistance.')
In the view of this writer, a substantial role can be played by the
First Amendment, and the courts, if the Supreme Court will deign to
recede from its perspective in Zemel and recognize a protectible First
Amendment right to the acquisition of information.
It will be recalled that Lamont did grant recognition to one aspect
of this right when it established a protectible First Amendment interest
in the recipient of a communication.' 2' It must be recognized, however,
that even standing alone, this passive receipt is a strategically different
interest than the active acquisition of information.
Mr. Apthecker had asked the Court for the recognition of a First
Amendment interest in acquisition of an active nature. His particular
plea was to extend recognition to that interest in the form of the observations which he intended to make while abroad. 2 2 His argument was that
to preclude him from travel was to preclude him from making the
observations, and that to preclude him from making those observations
was to limit, in the manner of a prior restraint, his competence to exercise
his freedom of expression upon his return. The Court ignored this plea.
Mr. Zemel's contentions were basically a cross between the two. The
First Amendment interest which he asserted did not expressly relate to
any intention to discuss his observations upon his return from Cuba. He
asserted his right as the mere receipt of information, through observations, relative to his understanding and evaluation of United States policy
toward Cuba."2" Having determined that the receipt of information was a
protectible interest in Lamont, the Court nonetheless expressly rejected
Mr. Zemel's contention on the ground that:
[While] the Secretary's refusal to validate passports to Cuba
renders less than wholly free the flow of information concerning
119. Id. at 903.

120. Id. at 954. This particular language was specifically directed at the problem of
secrecy in government. Furthermore, Professor Emerson is not absolutely opposed to the
principle of judicial participation in the attempt to find solutions to these problems as the
text, infra, might imply. He does, however, appear to place his primary faith in the legislative and executive branches, as opposed to the judiciary. Therein lies the point of this
writer's departure from the professor's perspective.
121. See text accompanying notes 97 & 98 supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 49 & 54 supra.
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that country.., we cannot accept the contention of the appellant that it is a First Amendment right which is involved ...
The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.'24
The declaration was certainly ill-advised. Quite aside from any
historically phrased declaration that the First Amendment "does" or
"does not" carry with it such a right, the urgent needs of contemporary
America clearly called for a different result.
The Court would justify its decision on the "unrestrained" potential
of the right to acquire information. This justification is difficult to accept.
It was not urged by Mr. Zemel, nor is it urged here, that the right of
acquisition be unrestrained. No right ever recognized by the Constitution
or the Court has ever been totally unrestrained. Indeed, it is perhaps the
greatest continuing talent of the Court, that it has wisely incorporated
essential limitations into each of our critical rights while still preserving
the essence of each. Appreciation of this wisdom necessarily calls for a
question. Why could not these same talents be utilized to incorporate any
needed limitations on this critically needed aspect of the freedom of
expression? It is inconsistent to recognize the capacity of the Court in the
expressive side of the First Amendment, and thereafter accept the proposition that it would be unable to adequately restrain the acquisitive side
of that same amendment.
It is equally difficult to accept the view that the refusal of the Court
to recognize such a First Amendment interest is of little practical effect.
The objection of the Court itself seems to be directed to the fear that the
effect would be too great. Indeed, a wisely administered "right to acquire
information" could well provide a basis for the long awaited balancing of
the public interest in knowing versus the governmental interest in secrecy.
Most important, however, a wisely administered "right to acquire information" might well be the urgently needed starting point for a revitalization of public participation in the decision making process of democratic government.
Alexander Meiklejohn expressed the urgency so very eloquently
when he declared, "Free men need the truth as they need nothing else."' 25
The truth to which Meiklejohn referred is the truth to which the First
Amendment speaks. It was never intended to be government directed
"truth," calculated to invoke support for its policies and disdain for its
critics. Truth in the Meiklejohn sense, in the First Amendment sense, is
the basis for, and the goal of, a full, free and intelligent exchange of ideas.
It is the "stuff" democracy must be made of, and the extension of the
First Amendment toward a recognition of a right to acquire information
might well be one assurance of that "stuff" which we so critically need.
124. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
125. ME RLEJOHN, PouTxcA FREEDoM 59 (1st ed. 1960).

